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By reason of his scholarly writings, Father Snee has earned a repui-
tation as a constitutional lawyer which lends authority to his declara-
tion: "[S]tate activity which does not in any way infringe the religious
freedom of the individual should not be forbidden to the states simply
because it happens to fit the Supreme Court's idea of a 'law respecting
an establishment of religion'-"
Religious Disestablishment
and the Fourteenth Amendment*
JOSEPH M. SNEE, S.J.
T HE PRECISE QUESTION in this paper is whether the religious freedom
now guaranteed against state interference under the liberty of the
Fourteenth Amendment places exactly the same restrictions upon state
action as are placed by the First Amendment upon federal activity - not
only under the free exercise clause but under the establishment clause
as well. First, it is essential to determine whether the two clauses are
synonymous or whether they can be distinguished. Secondly, if they can
and should be distinguished, can the establishment clause legitimately be
read into the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?
It is my contention that these two clauses of the First Amendment
can and must be distinguished, and that the establishment clause per sel
should not, and historically and logically cannot, be incorporated into
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The validity of this
contention must be sought in the history which led to the adoption of
the First Amendment in its present form as well as in the judicial inter-
pretation of the Amendment. A careful investigation of these sources
leads me to the conclusion that the establishment clause of the First
Amendment, as distinguished from the free exercise clause, both in the
mind of the framers of the Amendment and their contemporaries, as well
as in the judgment of the Supreme Court during the last century, was
meant to accomplish one or both of two purposes. It is clearly regarded:
(1) as a reservation of power to the respective states; and (2) possibly
as a politically wise means of forestalling any abridgment of the religious
freedom of the free exercise clause on the part of the then suspect federal
*Digested from an article appearing in 1954 Washington Law Review. No. 4
at 372.
Father Snee is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law School.
11 say "per se" because certain types of establishment would be forbidden under the
Fourteenth Amendment, not because they are establishments, but because they are
such as to infringe the religious liberty protected by that Amendment.
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power. These two purposes are found ex-
pressed side by side in the debates in the
ratifying conventions 2 and in the legislative
history of the First Amendment. Either pur-
pose implies an intent to impose upon the
federal government a political duty, rather
than to confer upon the citizen a consti-
tutional right,3 and what is not a constitu-
tional right under the First Amendment can
hardly be a fundamental concept of liberty
protected by the Fourteenth!
Debates in the Ratifying
Conventions
The debates in the ratifying conventions
of the several states, and the amendments
which they proposed to the Constitution,
show the contemporary understanding of
the relation of the federal government to the
subject of religion. The absence of a federal
Bill of Rights safeguarding, among other
things, religious freedom was excused on
the ground that the federal government was
one of delegated powers only; that religion
was one of the matters over which power
'These debates are found in Elliot, The Debates of
the Several State Conventions on the Adoption
of the Federal Constitution (2d ed. 1836) (here-
inafter cited as Elliot). It is unfortunate that there
is no similar record of the debates on the First
Amendment, when this was submitted to the states
for ratification.
'Of course, a violation of this political duty by
the federal government, adversely affecting a citi-
zen, would be indirectly a violation of his con-
stitutional rights under the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment. An analogous situation
would be an attempt by the federal government
to regulate wholly intra-state commerce or in-
ternal property rights, or to take over completely
the field now covered by criminal laws of the
states. Where there is no right to command, there
is no duty to obey. But in all these cases the federal
government has no right to command, not because
of a constitutional guarantee running to the in-
dividual, but because only the state has the requi-
site right under the Constitution.
had not been so delegated and hence re-
mained within the exclusive cognizance of
the respective states.
This general argument was made in
.Pennsylvania on 23 October 1787 by Mr.
Wilson,4 and in Massachusetts on 23 Janu-
ary 1788 by Mr. Bowdoin5 and Mr. Par-
sons." Other advocates of the Constitution
entered more fully into the precise question
of religious freedom.
In Virginia, Patrick Henry objected
strenuously to the absence of a Bill of Rights
in general, and of a guarantee of religious
freedom in particular 7 - probably because
he found this not so much a stumbling
block as a convenient peg on which to hang
his opposition to the whole proposed Con-
stitution. His objections were ably met by
both Governor Randolph and James Madi-
son in terms which left no doubt of their
own views on the relation of the federal
government to religion. Thus, on 10 June
1788, Governor Randolph, in reply to
Patrick Henry, found a guarantee of reli-
gious freedom in the prohibition against any
religious tests and vitiated further difficulties
in these words:
It has been said that, if the exclusion of
the religious test were an exception from the
general power of Congress, the power over
religions would remain. I inform those who
are of this opinion, that no power is given
expressly to Congress over religion. The
senators and representatives, members of
the state legislatures, and executive and
judicial officers, are bound, by oath or af-
firmation, to support this Constitution. This
only binds them to support it in the exer-
'2 Elliot 435, 436.
52 id. at 87.
"2 id. at 90, 93.
'3 id. at 44, 314, 462, 587, 588.
'U.S. Const. art. VI.
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cise of the powers constitutionally given it!
And on 15 June Governor Randolph
again urged this lack of any federal power
over religion in reply to further objections
by Mr. Henry:
He [Patrick Henry] has added religion
to the objects endangered, in his concep-
tion. Is there any power given over it? Let
it be pointed out. Will he not be contented
with the answer that has been frequently
given to that objection? .. .No part of the
Constitution, even if strictly construed, will
justify a conclusion that the general gov-
ernment can take away or impair the free-
dom of religion."0
James Madison, whose views will be dis-
cussed later at greater length, made the same
point on 12 June 1788, again in reply to
the worrisome Patrick Henry:
There is not a shadow of right in the
general government to inter-meddle with
religion. Its least interference with it would
be a most flagrant usurpation."
It is clear from the debates in the ratify-
ing conventions that many of the most ar-
dent supporters of the Constitution argued,
and evidently succeeded in convincing their
colleagues, that religion was a subject re-
served to the states, over which the Con-
stitution delegated to the federal govern-
ment no power whatsoever.
Their success is evinced by the failure in
several states to propose any amendments
on religious freedom, and by the form which
the proposed amendments on this subject
assumed in other states. This is all the more
striking in view of the vigorous debates on
religious freedom in the various state rati-
fying conventions. The nine amendments
'3 Elliot 204.
103 id. at 469.
"3 id. at 330.
proposed by Massachusetts 12 contained no
mention of religion at all. South Carolina,
where the Protestant religion was declared
in so many words to be the established
religion of the state,'- was content to sug-
gest that the third section of Article VI of
the Constitution be amended to read:
"but no other religious Test shall ever be
required."'1 4 The Committee on Amend-
ments in the Maryland Convention rejected
the proposed amendment: "That there be
no national religion established by law; but
that all persons be equally entitled to pro-
tection in their religious liberty."'5
In Virginia, the Committee Report on
the Declaration of Rights and on Amend-
ments was accepted by the Convention and
voted into the ratification of the Constitu-
tion. The Committee, of which Madison
was a member, included in the declaration
of rights a paragraph on religious freedom
121 id. at 322, 323.
"S.C. Const. art. XXXVIII (1778). This provision
betrays some of the contemporary confusion be-
tween the establishment of a religious sect and the
incorporation of religious societies: when it was
eliminated in Article VIII. Section 1, of the North
Carolina Constitution (1790), it was felt neces-
sary to provide that this change did not affect prop-
erty rights of the various religious societies [S.C.
Const. art. Vll. §2 (1790)]. The same confusion
may be seen in Madison's message vetoing a bill
to incorporate an Episcopal church in Alexandria,
D.C. See 22 Annals of Cong. 982, 983 (1811).
The same confusion is present in the cases of Tur-
pin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804); Selden
v. Overseers of Poor, 38 Va. (I1 Leigh) 127
(1840); and in state constitutional provisions for-
bidding such incorporation. For the latter, see
Va. Const. art. IV, §32 (1850); Va. Const. art.
IV, §30 (1864); Va. Const. art. V, §17 (1870);
Va. Const. art. IV, §59 (1902); W. Va. Const. art.
XI. §2 (1861-63); W. Va. Const. art. VI, §47
(1872). This prohibition is still contained in the
constitutions of Virginia and West Virginia.
1 Elliot 325.
11'2 id. at 552, 553. The Maryland convention did
not propose any amendments to Congress.
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taken from the Virginia Bill of Rights. 16
But significantly, religious freedom was not
the subject of any of the amendments rec-
ommended by the Committee and proposed
to Congress by the Convention, probably
because this was thought to be provided
for by the first of the amendments recom-
mended and proposed, which read:
That each state in the Union shall re-
spectively retain every power, jurisdiction,
and right, which is not by this Constitution
delegated to the Congress of the United
States, or to the departments of the federal
government.'
The procedure adopted in Virginia was
followed to the letter by North Carolina' 8
and Rhode Island,' i.e., the inclusion of
religious freedom in the declaration of rights
and its omission from the list of proposed
amendments, among which was, however,
the "reservation of powers" amendment as
proposed by Virginia.
Only New York20 and New Hampshire 2'
made any definite recommendations to Con-
gress on the relation of the federal govern-
ment to the subject of religion. The declara-
tion proposed by New York was:
That the people have an equal, natural,
and unalienable right freely and peaceably
to exercise their religion according to the
dictates of conscience; and that no religious
sect, or society ought to be favored or estab-
lished by law in preference to others.'
The wording of the New Hampshire pro-
posal reflects the same policy which under-
163 id. at 657-59. The Virginia guarantee of re-
ligious freedom is found in Va. Bill of Rights §16
(1776).
"3 Elliot 659. See also the Preamble, 3 id. at 656.
"4 id. at 242-47.
' I id. at 334-37.
2'J id. at 328.
(1948); and Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947).
211 id. at 326.
221 id. at 328.
lies the phrasing of the First Amendment,
to which it is very similar: "Congress shall
make no laws touching religion, or to in-
fringe the rights of conscience. '2 1 New
Hampshire's constitution required profes-
sion of the Protestant religion as a qualifica-
tion for the offices of state senator, repre-
sentative and governor,2 4 and impowered
the state legislature to authorize the munic-
ipalities to provide for the "support and
maintenance of public protestant teachers
of piety, religion and morality. 25 It seems
not unreasonable to infer that the precise
wording of the New Hampshire amend-
ment was designed to prevent the federal
government not only from infringing the
liberty of New Hampshire citizens by some
other religious establishment but also from
passing any laws "touching" the then exist-
ing New Hampshire establishment.
The Drafting of the
First Amendment
Considerable light is shed on the precise
question now before us by a careful investi-
gation of the legislative history-"' of the First
'I id. at 326.
"N.H. Const. Part I1 Senate (1784); Id. at Part
11 House of Representatives; Id. at Part II Council.
These provisions were retained in N.H. Const.
Part II, .§§XIV, XXIX, XLII (1792). The qualifica-
tion was eliminated by an amendment framed by
a state convention in 1876 and ratified by the peo-
ple on 13 March 1877. 4 American Charters,
Constitutions, and Organic Laws 2492 (Thorpe
ed. 1909).
"N.H. Const. Part I, art. VI (1784); Id. at Part
I, art. VI (1792). This provision is still to be
found in the constitution of New Hampshire.
'The Supreme Court apparently attaches great im-
portance to the legislative history of the First
Amendment, as is evidenced by Zorach v. Clau-
son, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. Mc-
Collum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203
(1948): and Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. I (1947).
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Amendment from Madison's first introduc-
tion of proposed amendments 27 on 8 June
1789 until they were sent in final form to
President Washington on 24 September
1789 for submission to the states. 28 A dis-
criminating study of its history and context
will, I believe, justify a conclusion that the
establishment clause was meant to reserve
powers to the several states, while the free
exercise clause was meant to guarantee re-
ligious liberty of the individual citizen
against federal encroachment.
Madison submitted his amendments, in-
cluding the "Bill of Rights," to the House
of Representatives on 8 June 1789. Two of
his amendments, the fourth and fifth, dealt
expressly with the subject of religion. His
fourth amendment was to be inserted in
Article 1, Section 9, of the Constitution
2 9
in the following terms: ...The civil rights
of none shall be abridged on account of
religious belief or worship, nor shall any
national religion be established, nor shall
the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner,or on any pretext, infringed.
3 0
'1 Annals of Cong. 431-42 (1789). Madison pro-
posed two amendments to secure religious free-
dom. His fourth amendment restricted federal ac-
tivity, and his fifth amendment guarded against
state action. For brevity I refer to these in the
text above as his "federal amendment" and "state
amendment," respectively. His state amendment
was eliminated by the Senate. His federal amend-
ment, as altered by the House, was the third of
those actually submitted to the states for ratifica-
tion. The first two failing of ratification, this be-
came our present First Amendment. These facts
lend a certain touch of ironic humor to Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson's statement: "This freedom was first
in the Bill of Rights because it was first in the
forefathers' minds .. " See Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18, 26 (1947) (dissenting
opinion).
"Sl Annals of Cong. 913, 914 (1789).
'Under the rubric "Limitations upon Powers of
Congress."
'1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789).
His fifth amendment, to guarantee reli-
gious freedom against encroachment by the
states, was to be inserted in Article 1, Sec-
tion 10, of the Constitution 31 in this form:
No State shall violate the equal rights of
conscience, or the freedom of the press, or
the trial by jury in criminal cases '. 3 2
And finally he proposed a new article'3
to the Constitution which, after expressly
providing for a separation of powers among
the three branches of the federal govern-
ment, declared:
The powers not delegated by this Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively.3 4
A comparison of these three amendments
proposed by Mr. Madison, especially in
view of the theories which he had pro-
pounded in the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion, 3 5 leads to some interesting conclusions.
Both the federal and state amendments
proposed by Mr. Madison (his fourth and
fifth amendments, respectively) protect the
"equal rights of conscience," the one against
infringement by the federal government, the
other against violation by the states. But
the federal amendment placed further re-
strictions upon the exercise of federal power,
which the state amendment did not impose
upon state competence in the matter of re-
ligion. For the federal amendment expressly
further commanded the federal government
that "[t]he civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or
"Under the rubric "Restrictions upon Powers of
States."
'I Annals of Cong. 435 (1789).
'To be called art. VII, and the present art. VII to
be renumbered as art. VIII. I Annals of Cong.
435, 436 (1789).
"I Annals of Cong. 436 (1789).
'See page 302 et seq, supra. 3 Elliot 330.
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worship, nor shall any national religion be
established. .. ."
When this difference is read in the con-
text of his "reservation of powers" amend-
ment, it is clear that he concedes to the states
power over religious matters which he would
deny to the federal government. This con-
clusion may be established on either of two
grounds. First, the federal amendment ex-
pressly declares that the federal government
shall have no power to abridge civil rights
on account of religious belief or worship,
or to establish a national religion. Such
powers are, therefore, not delegated to the
federal government by the Constitution and
hence, by the provisions of the "reservation"
amendment, are to be deemed reserved to
the states respectively. Secondly, while the
state amendment prohibits the states from
violating the equal rights of conscience, it
does not place upon them the further restric-
tion put by the federal amendment upon the
federal government. It does not forbid the
states to abridge the civil rights of its citi-
zens on religious grounds (as clearly distin-
guished from "equal rights of conscience"),
nor does it forbid them to establish a reli-
gion, provided only that the equal rights of
conscience be not violated. Since these
powers are not prohibited to the states by
the Constitution they are, by the provisions
of the "reservation" amendment, to be
deemed reserved to the states.
From the original draft of the amend-
ments, as proposed by Madison, two points
are clear. First, in Madison's view, a law
infringing or violating the equal rights of
conscience is one thing; and a law which
abridges civil rights on religious grounds
or establishes a religion is quite another.
Otherwise, it would be logically unsound
to make the distinction which he does make,
in two juxtaposed amendments, between
restrictions upon federal power and those
upon state power. It would betray not only
unsound logic but faulty draftsmanship.Y6
Secondly, when the difference between
these two amendments is read in the light
of the "reservation" amendment, the con-
clusion is inescapable that both amendments
protect the religious liberty of the citizen
against encroachment by either federal or
state governments, while the state amend-
ment has the added function of reserving
to the states certain other powers over the
subject of religion, provided only that there
be no violation of the equal rights of con-
science by any state in the exercise of the
powers thus reserved.
Madison's concept of the function of the
establishment clause of the federal amend-
ment is strikingly clarified by his defense
of his proposed fifth amendment. Mr.
Tucker of South Carolina, where the state
constitution expressly established the
"Christian Protestant religion,"3 objected
to this restriction upon state power:
This is offered, I presume, as an amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United
States, but it goes only to the alteration of
the constitutions of particular states. It will
be much better, I apprehend, to leave the
State Governments to themselves, and not
to interfere with them more than we
already do; and that is thought by many
to be rather too much. I therefore move,
sir, to strike out these words."
Madison's reply in defense of his pro-
'See the remark of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Ever-
son v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 31 (1947)
(dissenting opinion), approving James Madison's
conclusion that the First Amendment is a "Model
of technical precision, and perspicuous brevity."
'S.C. Const. art. XXXVIII (1778).
'I1 Annals of Cong. 755 (1789).
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posed restrictions upon state power, and the
reasons he advances for their adoption, are
highly significant in arriving at his under-
standing of the two proposed amendments
on the subject of religion, and especially of
the function of the establishment clause.
His reply is thus reported:
MR. MADISON conceived this to be the
most valuable amendment in the whole list.
If there were any reason to restrain the
Government of the United States from in-
fringing upon these essential rights, it was
equally necessary that they should be se-
cured against the State Governments. He
thought that if they provided against the
one, it was as necessary to provide against
the other, and was satisfied that it would
be equally grateful to the people.'
Madison, whose interpretation of the
First Amendment seems to carry great
weight with the present Supreme Court,
40
thought it "equally necessary" to restrain
both federal and state governments "from
infringing upon these essential rights." In
attempting to accomplish this equally neces-
sary purpose, he did not regard it as essen-
tial that state governments as well as the
federal should be commanded by the Con-
stitution that "no religion shall be established
by law." It is indeed stressing the obvious
to conclude that, in his mind at least, the
two were quite distinct and that the estab-
lishment of a religion by law is not per se
an infringement of the equal rights of con-
science. Further, the prohibition against
establishment is not a prerequisite of reli-
gious freedom. Hence, however great his
desire to protect religious freedom - and
$Jbid.
'°See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S.
94 (1952); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed-
ucation, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
he regarded the restriction upon state power
as "the most valuable amendment in the
whole list" - he would encroach upon the
reserved power of the states only to the
extent necessary to protect the equal rights
of conscience; he would leave it to the indi-
vidual states to adopt such measures in the
field of religion as they saw fit, provided only
that they did not thereby infringe those
rights. It is highly unfortunate that, in view
of the recent judicial interpretation of the
First Amendment as read into the Four-
teenth, it should now be necessary to stress
the obvious!
During the next several months the legis-
lature hotly debated these original amend-
ments and on 7 September 1789 the Senate
finally rejected the proposed amendment
restricting state power over religion. A short
time later, as the result of a joint legislative
conference on the remaining amendments,
the following formula was produced for
what is now the First Amendment:
.. . Congress shall make -no LAW RE-
SPECTING AN ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELIGION, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
Speech, or of the Press; or the right of the
People peaceably to assemble and petition
the Government for a redress of Griev-
ances. ... "
Whatever may have been the effect of
the Senate's rejection of the amendment
limiting state power over religion, the ac-
cepted formula clearly reserved to the states
any and all power over religion, provided
only that the equal rights of conscience were
not thereby infringed. Now that the latter
restriction (Madison's fifth amendment)
had been removed, the states were left ab-
41Journal of the First Session of the Senate 145
(1802).
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solutely free to legislate on the subject of
religion. Congress could not prohibit the
free exercise of religion, but it was left pow-
erless to interfere with the states if they
chose to do so. Only the establishment
clause, as an explication of the general reser-
vation of power in the Tenth Amendment,
explains this Congressional impotence. It
would be more than naive to suggest that
Congress was unable to protect the religious
liberty of American citizens against state
action on the ground that it was forbidden
"to prohibit the free exercise" of religion!
The First Amendment, therefore, is not
only an express guarantee of personal reli-
gious freedom against the threat of federal
action, but also an application of the prin-
ciple of federalism. The two purposes must
be clearly and unequivocally distinguished,
as must the two clauses in which these pur-
poses are separately expressed. The two
clauses together were intended12 to remove
the subject of religion completely from the
federal competence. Much ink has been
spilt over Jefferson's metaphorical descrip-
tion of the First Amendment as building a
wall of separation. 43 As Cardozo once re-
marked, a metaphor is indeed a dangerous
and shifting foundation for a rule of law,
but at the risk of making confusion worse
confounded, I make bold to suggest that the
First Amendment built not one, but two
walls of separation. It built a wall between
the federal government and the American
citizen, because it forbade Congress to make
"An expanding concept of federal jurisdiction has,
of course, led the federal government into areas
which at that time were regarded as completely
reserved to the states. This expanding concept will
be reflected, of course, in the reservation effected
by the establishment clause, as discussed later in
this paper.
'The Complete Jefferson 518, 519 (Padover ed.
1943).
any law "prohibiting the free exercise" of
his chosen religion. 44 When Congress was
further forbidden to make any "law respect-
ing an establishment of religion," a second
wall was built. But, in the mind of the fram-
ers of the First Amendment, the establish-
ment clause drew a line of demarcation, not
between federal power and personal free-
dom, but between federal and state sover-
eignty. It is difficult to understand by what
logical or historical tour de force the wall
erected by the establishment clause between
those two sovereignties, which left the states
free to interfere at will with the religious
freedom of their own citizens, can be con-
strued to be a positive guarantee of religious
freedom. The establishment clause expressly
made it impossible for the federal govern-
ment to give to the American citizen positive
protection in the exercise of the very free-
dom which by the free exercise clause it was
forbidden to infringe; this was something
reserved to the states. By what magical meta-
morphosis does a clause which, under the
First Amendment is expressly a reservation
of power to the states, become a denial of
that very power by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
"That Jefferson, in his letter to the Danbury Bap-
tists, was dealing with this first wall of separation
is clear from even a casual reading of the docu-
ment:
Believing with you that religion is a matter
which lies solely between man and his God,
that he owes account to none other for his faith
or his worship, that the legislative power of
government reach actions only, and not opin-
ions. ...
Ibid. None of these truths give rise to "establish-
ment" problems, unless the establishment clause
be given the peculiar interpretation which it re-
ceived from Mr. Justice Roberts in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Justice
Roberts' construction of the clause will be con-
sidered later in this paper.
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The legislative history of the First Amend-
ment would indicate therefore that the estab-
lishment clause was meant by its framers to
remove the whole subject of religion from
the jurisdiction of the federal government
and to make it exclusively a matter for state
cognizance. By reserving this power to the
states, the establishment clause imposed a
political duty upon the federal government
without directly conferring a constitutional
right upon the citizen,45 while the free exer-
cise clause directly guaranteed to the citizen
a right of religious freedom against en-
croachment by the federal government.
Religion and the States before the
Fourteenth Amendment
Though the Supreme Court, in Barron
v. Mayor of Baltimore,41' had held that the
Fifth Amendment was not a restriction upon
the states, it was not until 1845, in Permoli
v. First Municipality,47 that it considered
whether the religious guarantees of the First
Amendment protected against state action.
The Court decided there was no such pro-
tection and stated its decision in language
which left no doubt that the protection and
regulation of religious liberty was a power
reserved under the Constitution to the states:
The Constitution makes no provision for
protecting the citizens of the respective
States in their religious liberties; this is left
to the State constitutions and laws: nor is
there any inhibition imposed by the Con-
stitution of the United States in this re-
spect on the States.'4
Though the case does not expressly rely
on the distinction between the establishment
'"See note 3 supra.
4632 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
'"Id. at 609.
and free exercise clauses, this distinction is
implicit in the holding of the case. By being
precluded from "prohibiting the free exer-
cise" of religion, the federal government is
not precluded from protecting the citizen
against the states in that exercise. It is ex-
pressly so precluded precisely because it
may "make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion." The principle of federal-
ism formed the basis for the Court's rejec-
tion49 of the contention that state action
violated the guarantees of religious freedom
in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance50 and in
the 1811 Enabling Act for Louisiana. 1 Of
these statutes the Court said:
So far as they conferred political rights,
and secured civil and religious liberties
(which are political rights), the laws of
Congress were all superseded by the state
constitution; nor is any part of them in force,
unless they were adopted by the constitution
of Louisiana, as laws of the state. It is not
possible to maintain that the United States
hold in trust, by force of the ordinance, for
the people of Louisiana, all the great ele-
mental principles, or any one of them, con-
tained in the ordinance, and secured to the
people of the Orleans territory, during its
existence/
Provisions made, therefore, to protect the
religious freedom of the inhabitants of a
territory, and even an enabling act requiring
the minimal guarantees of religious freedom
'"Id. at 610.
'"2 Federal and State Constitutions 957 (Thorpe
ed. 1909). Rights guaranteed by this Ordinance
of 1787 were extended to the Mississippi Terri-
tory by the Act of April 7, 1798, 1 Stat. 549, 550
(1798); and by the Act of March 2, 1805, 2 Stat.
329 (1805), the inhabitants of the Territory of
Orleans (now the State of Louisiana) acquired all
the rights of the people of the Territory of Mis-
sissippi.
"'Act of Feb. 20, 1811, 2 Stat. 641 (1811).
"
2Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
589, 610 (1845).
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in the state to be admitted, 3 could not
operate to deprive the state of its exclusive
competence, for good or for evil, in the
sphere of religion - a power reserved by
the Constitution to the several states.
The treaty of 1803 with France, ceding
the Louisiana Territory to the United States,
also contained guarantees of religious free-
dom for the inhabitants. 54 Counsel in the
Permoli case did not argue the applicability
of these provisions. It would be interesting,
but unrewarding, to speculate whether the
Court would have held them to be appli-
cable. '5 There is, therefore, no case directly
in point to the effect that the federal govern-.
ment under its treaty-making power might
have interfered to a limited extent with state
establishments - as had been suggested in
the debates of the North Carolina ratifying
convention)76 The result, however, which
might be expected is indicated by Munici-
pality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church.IT The question there raised was
whether the Church in Puerto Rico had
juridical personality, with capacity to sue
and be sued or to acquire and possess prop-
erty, independently of any incorporation by
the government of the island. The Court
considered this question to be settled in the
affirmative by the provisions of Article 8 of
'lt is interesting to note that it was not until 1868
that Louisiana enacted a constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom. La. Const. tit. 1, art. 12
(1868). The earlier constitutions of 1812, 1845.
1852, and 1864 did not provide an express guar-
antee.
'Art. Ill. See 3 Federal and State Constitutions
1360 (Thorpe ed. 1909).
"'See construction given a similar treaty provision
in The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1 (1890).
'4 Elliot 191-94.
'210 U.S. 296 (1908).
the Treaty of Paris,58 which expressly se-
cured the existing capacity of ecclesiastical
bodies in Puerto Rico and other former
Spanish territories to acquire and possess
property. The Court also took judicial notice
of the position of the Holy See in interna-
tional law.
The case clearly involved federal action
respecting an establishment of religion. It
secured to the Catholic Church in the former
Spanish territories the same juridical per-
sonality (at least as to capacity to sue and
be sued, and to acquire or hold property),
as it had possessed under Spanish law as
the sole state-recognized church. To some
extent it gave a favored position to the
Catholic Church, since it was in fact the only
religious body then legally existing in Puerto
Rico. But there could be no claim that this
provision was one which prohibited the free
exercise of religion, provided at least that
the other religious bodies which later found
their way into these territories should be
given the opportunity of acquiring legal per-
sonality by means of incorporation.
At the same time, there can be no doubt
that the federal government would be abso-
lutely precluded from using even the treaty
power as a pretext for prohibiting the free
exercise of religion in the acquired territories
or in the territories within the jurisdiction
of individual states. The difference can be
explained only on the ground that the estab-
lishment clause removed the question of re-
ligion from the jurisdiction of the United
States as an application of the principle of
federalism, and this reservation of power
is subject to the exception of a legitimate
use of the treaty power, just as is every other
power reserved to the respective states. A
"30 Stat. 1758 (1898).
OCTOBER, 1955
treaty might provide that citizens or former
citizens of a foreign power be guaranteed
complete religious liberty, and to that extent
interfere with state sovereignty and state
establishments. Such would be a valid use
of the treaty power, and such agreements
have frequently been made with foreign
nations. ' 9 But, at least prior to the Four-
teenth Amendment, the federal government
could not by agreement with a foreign na-
tion provide that all inhabitants of the indi-
vidual states, whether foreign nationals or
American citizens, be granted the most
complete religious freedom and that all
state establishments be eliminated,60 any
more than it could thereby provide that in-
heritance throughout the states should
henceforth be per capita and not per stirpes.
Nor could a treaty ever operate to restrict
the inhabitants of the several states in the
exercise of such religious freedom as was
conferred by the constitutions and laws of
those states. The command that Congress,
or the federal government, 61 shall not pro-
hibit the free exercise of religion is, within
its proper scope, absolute and restricts that
government in the exercise of each and every
power which it possesses under the Consti-
tution. No treaty could opdrate to prohibit
this free exercise of religion, because this is
a constitutional guarantee running from the
19See Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico
art. IX (1848) [1 Federal and State Constitutions
381 (Thorpe ed. 1909)]; Treaty Ceding Louisiana
art. III (1803) [3 Federal and State Constitutions
1360 (Thorpe ed. 1909)].
'°I prescind here from the question whether this
might be done under the treaty known as the
United Nations Charter.
"Although the words of the First Amendment re-
fer only to Congress, there can be no doubt that it
was intended as a restriction upon all branches of
the federal government. Cf. United States v. Bal-
lard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), where it was applied to
judicial proceedings.
federal government to every person within
the United States.62 That is not the case
with the establishment clause. This, like so
many other clauses of the Constitution,
draws a line between federal and state
sovereignty - a line which the federal gov-
ernment may legitimately, per modum
exceptionis, overstep in the exercise of the
treaty-making power.61
The Establishment Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment became
effective in 1868. It was not until 1940,
almost seventy-two years later, that the
Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut64
expressly held that this Amendment incor-
porated the religious freedom guaranteed
by the First Amendment. The Cantwell
decision, however, had already been fore-
shadowed by a dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan in Berea College v. Ken-
tucky65 and by dicta in Meyer v. Nebraska.66
Eleven years after the Meyer dicta, 67 the
Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Regents68
denied that students had a right, because of
conscientious scruples, to be exempted from
military training at the University of Cali-
'Language used in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathe-
dral, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952), raises the interest-
ing question whether the constitutional protection
extends to those who are outside the jurisdiction
of the United States.
'See the classic case of Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416 (1920).
'310 U.S. 296 (1940).
'See 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (dissenting opinion).
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
97L omit mention of Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
268 U. S. 510 (1925), since - despite its religious
overtones - it was not concerned with religious
freedom.
-293 U.S. 245 (1934).
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fornia. The Court there made this comment
on the "liberty" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment:
There need be no attempt to enumerate
or comprehensively to define what is in-
cluded in the "liberty" protected by the due
process clause. Undoubtedly it does include
the right to entertain the beliefs, to adhere
to the principles and to teach the doctrines
on which these students base their objec-
tions to the order prescribing military train-
ing."
These cases, while intimating that reli-
gious freedom is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment,70 do not do so by incorporating
into that Amendment the prohibitions of
the First. The earliest suggestion that this
is, or should be, the case was made by Car-
dozo concurring in Hamilton v. Regents:7'
I assume for present purposes that the re-
ligious liberty protected by the First Amend-
ment against invasion by the nation is pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against invasion by the states.
Accepting that premise, I cannot find in
the respondents' ordinance an obstruction
by the state to "the free exercise" of religion
as the phrase was understood by the found-
ers of the nation, and by the generations that
have followed. . . .The First Amendment,
if it be read into the Fourteenth, makes
invalid any state law "respecting an estab-
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." Instruction in military
science is not instruction in the practice or
tenets of a religion. Neither directly nor
indirectly is government establishing a state
religion when it insists upon such training.
Instruction in military science, unaccom-
'Old. at 262.
7Conitra: Brunswick-Balke-Collander Co. v. Evans.
228 Fed. 991 (D.C. Ore. 1916), appeal dismissed,
248 U.S. 587 (1918); In re King, 46 Fed. 905,
912 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1891).
"See 293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934) (concurring opin-
ion).
panied here by any pledge of military serv-
ice, is not an interference by the state with
the free exercise of religion when the liber-
ties of the constitution are read in the light
of a century and a half of history during days
of peace and war.'2
The "incorporation" theory, whereby
Cardozo for the first time read. into the
Fourteenth Amendment the guarantee of
religious freedom as formulated in the First,
was followed by Mr. Justice Roberts' ex-
press holding to this effect in Cantwell v.
Connecticut:
73
The fundamental concept of liberty em-
bodied in that [the Fourteenth] Amendment
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the
First Amendment. The First Amendment
declares that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the
legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws."
Roberts here explains the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment, as
does Cardozo, in terms of the First Amend-
ment formula. Roberts and Cardozo include
in the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment both the establishment and free exer-
cise clauses of the First. But both of them
explain the establishment clause in terms of
an establishment which is also of its very
nature an interference with the free exercise
of religion. For Cardozo it meant "govern-
ment establishing a state religion." Roberts,
relying like Cardozo on the similar inter-
pretation given to establishment in Davis
v. Beason,7 "- also explains the forbidden
"Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934)
(concurring opinion).
"310 U.S. 296 (1940).
'lId. at 303.
"1133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
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establishment in terms which clearly indicate
a problem in religious liberty as such:
The constitutional inhibition of legisla-
tion on the subject of religion has a double
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls com-
pulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship.
Freedom of conscience and freedom to ad-
here to such religious organization or form
of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other
hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion . . . freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is abso-
lute, but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. 6
These two opinions represent the first
judicial attempt to read the establishment
clause into the concept of the "liberty" pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Both
cases dealt with problems of religious free-
dom and the free exercise of religion. The
establishment clause is explained in terms
of that freedom. It means freedom to be-
lieve and worship, while the free exercise
clause refers only to freedom to act in ac-
cordance with one's chosen belief.
Seven years later, in Everson v. Board of
Education,77 the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a case in which Roberts' inter-
pretation of the establishment clause proved
inadequate. There a New Jersey taxpayer
questioned the constitutionality of state
action authorizing reimbursement to parents
of sums expended by them in providing bus
transportation of their children to and from
school, including parochial schools. His
challenge was not based on the ground that
this constituted an interference with the free
exercise of his religion, but on the theory
that it was a "law respecting an establish-
0310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
'1330 U.S. 1 (1947).
ment of religion." It was obvious that there
was no interference with his freedom of be-
lief or worship. The Supreme Court, there-
fore, attempted to present a more compre-
hensive definition of the establishment
clause and, for the first time, to justify its
incorporation into the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice
Black's justification for including the estab-
lishment clause in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, while both facile and fascinating, is
hardly illuminating:
The meaning and scope of the First
Amendment, preventing establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, in the light of its history and the
evils it was designed forever to suppress,
have been several times elaborated by the
decisions of this Court prior to the applica-
tion of the First Amendment to the states
by the Fourteenth .... The broad meaning
given the Amendment by these earlier cases
has been accepted by this Court in its deci-
sions concerning an individual's religious
freedom rendered since the Fourteenth
Amendment was interpreted to make the
prohibitions of the First applicable to state
action abridging religious freedom. ...
There is every reason to give the same appli-
cation and broad interpretation to the "es-
tablishment of religion" clause. The interre-
lation of these complementary clauses was
well summarized in a statement of the Court
of Appeals of South Carolina . . . quoted
with approval by this Court in Watson v.
Jones... "The structure of our government
has, for the preservation of civil liberty, res-
cued the temporal institutions from religious
interference. On the other hand, it has se-
cured religious liberty from the invasions of
the civil authority.'" 8
This represents the only attempt by the
Supreme Court to state the reasons why the
establishment clause, especially with the
,lid. at 14, 15.
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broad interpretation later given it,19 should
be read into the "liberty" of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The reasoning of Mr. Justice
Black will, therefore, bear close analysis.
Such analysis and a study of the cases cited
show that his conclusion, to put it kindly,
is far from conclusive.
(I) Terrett v. Taylor,8 ° decided by Mr.
Justice Story in 1815, is first cited to show
the meaning and scope of the First Amend-
ment as elaborated by the Supreme Court.
In that case Virginia statutes of 1776, 1784
and 1785 confirmed to the Episcopal Church
in Virginia the title to lands acquired when
it was the established church, and also in-
corporated the individual vestries. On the
ground that these statutes were inconsistent
with the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776,81
the legislature attempted in 1798 and 1801
to divest the Episcopal Church of its glebe
lands and destroy the corporations earlier
created. The Supreme Court, reviewing a
decision of the lower federal court for the
District of Columbia,82 held this attempt to
be void as an unlawful seizure of private
property. The decision was not based on the
First Amendment - of which the Court
made no mention whatever. Of the Virginia
Bill of Rights guaranteeing religious free-
dom, the Court made this surprising state-
ment:
Consistent with the constitution of Vir-
ginia the legislature could not create or con-
tinue a religious establishment which should
have exclusive rights and prerogatives, or
compel the citizens to worship under a stipu-
7 id. at 15, 16.
' 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
"Va. Bill of Rights §16 (1776).
"'he case involved title to property of the Episco-
pal Church in Alexandria, in that part of the Dis-
trict of Columbia which had been ceded to the
United States by Virginia.
lated form of discipline, or to pay taxes to
those whose creed they could not conscien-
tiously believe. But the free exercise of reli-
gion cannot be justly deemed to be restrained
by aiding with equal attention the votaries
of every sect to perform their own religious
duties, or by establishing funds for the sup-
port of ministers, for public charities, for
the endowment of churches, or for the sep-
ulture of the dead. And that these purposes
could be better secured and cherished by
corporate powers, cannot be doubted by
any person who has attended to the difficul-
ties which surround all voluntary associa-
tions. While, therefore, the legislature might
exempt the citizens from a compulsive at-
tendance and payment of taxes in support
of any particular sect, it is not perceived that
either public or constitutional principles
required the abolition of all religious corpo-
rations"8
It is asserted by the legislature of Vir-
ginia, in 1798 and 1801, that this statute
was inconsistent with the bill of rights and
constitution of that State, and therefore
void. Whatever weight such a declaration
might properly have as the opinion of wise
and learned men, as a declaration of what
the law has been or is, it can have no deci-
sive authority. It is, however, encountered
by the opinion successively given by former
legislatures from the earliest existence of the
constitution itself, which were composed of
men of the very first rank for talents and
learning. And this opinion, too, is not only
a contemporaneous exposition of the con-
stitution, but has the additional weight that
it was promulgated or acquiesced in by a
great majority, if not the whole, of the very
framers of the constitution."
Of the other cases cited by Mr. Justice
Black after this inauspicious beginning,
Watson v. Jones"5 was not a First Amend-
"Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49
(1815).
"Id. at 51.
1180 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
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ment case and will be considered below.
Davis v. Beason 6 and Reynolds v. United
StatesA7 upheld the validity of statutes of
the Territories of Idaho and Utah, respec-
tively, placing legal sanctions on the prac-
tice of polygamy; both cases hold that the
free exercise clause does not confer immu-
nity for practices otherwise criminal. In
Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp,8a the Court
refused to declare invalid a federal contract
with the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions
to pay for the Catholic education of Indian
children at the request of their parents from
certain funds held by the federal govern-
ment. These "treaty funds" and "trust
funds," though held by the government,
were considered as belonging to the Indians.
They were not public moneys and hence
did not fall under a statutory prohibition
against expenditure of public moneys for
sectarian purposes. Of the contract with the
Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions, the
Court said: "It is not contended that it was
unconstitutional, and it could not be."89
The Court further held that to forbid the
Indians to spend their own money for sec-
tarian purposes, even though their funds
were administered by the federal govern-
ment, would be an interference with the free
exercise of their religion.
(2) The Everson opinion then states that
the "broad meaning given the [First] ...
Amendment by these earlier cases" has been
applied by the Court to state action involv-
ing an infringement of religious freedom.
Seven cases are cited, all decided since 1940,
upholding the free exercise of religion, es-
pecially freedom of evangelizing by Jeho-
-133 U.S. 333 (1890).
'798 U.S. 145 (1878).
81210 U.S. 50 (1908).
"Id. at 81.
vah's Witnesses, against state interference. U0
A casual reference is also made to Bradfield
v. Roberts,91 holding that Congress was not
precluded under the establishment clause
from contracting with a Catholic hospital
for the care of indigent patients in the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
(3) Against this background of judicial
interpretation of the First Amendment,
Mr. Justice Black finally reaches the crucial
question why the establishment clause
should also be applied to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment. This problem is
solved, neatly and with dispatch, by the
bland assertion: "There is every reason to
give the same application and broad inter-
pretation to the 'establishment of religion'
clause." '9 2 It is assumed, but not shown, that
the two clauses of the First Amendment are
both interrelated and complementary; and
their interrelation is asserted to be well sum-
marized by a quotation from an 1843 South
Carolina decision, cited with approval by
an 1872 opinion of the Supreme Court -
although neither case dealt with the First
Amendment!
In the case relied on, Harmon v. Dreher,"3
the court refused to recognize any rights to
church property in a Presbyterian minister
who had been excommunicated and un-
frocked by church authorities. Together with
hundreds of cases before and since, the
'Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Follett
v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944);
West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943);
Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Jamison
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
"175 U.S. 291 (1899).
'
2Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947).
"Speers Eq. 87, 120 (S.C. 1843).
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South Carolina court accepted as final the
excommunication imposed by the church
synod. It held that any re-adjudication of
this question by a civil court would be an
unwarranted intrusion by government into
the internal affairs of a religious body, to
the detriment of religious freedom. This was
quoted with approval in Watson v. Jones,94
where the court recognized as lawful owners
of a Presbyterian church in Louisville that
faction of the congregation which was recog-
nized by the General Assembly of the
Church. In both cases, even though civil
property rights depended on membership
in the church, a determination by lawful
church authority on the question of mem-
bership was regarded as controlling and
binding upon the civil courts. Both cases
rely on general principles of American juris-
prudence, rather than on constitutional
guarantees, 95 and neither case mentions in
this context the First Amendment.
The Harmon case certainly does not stand
for the proposition for which it is cited in
Everson - that the establishment and free
exercise clauses of the First Amendment are
so interrelated that both should be read into
the "liberty" of the Fourteenth. The first
dictum in the Harmon case, which says that
civil liberty has been preserved by rescuing
temporal institutions from religious inter-
ference, is most probably a reference to a
"80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1872).
'"That opinion [Watson v. Jones] has been given
consideration in subsequent church litigation -
state and national. The opinion itself, however,
did not turn on either the establishment or the
prohibition of the free exercise of religion." Ked-
roff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 110
(1952). The principle of the Watson case has been
severely criticized by one authority on the ground
that it is destructive of religious freedom. Zoll-
mann, American Civil Church Law 198-235
(1917).
peculiar South Carolina constitutional pro-
vision9" making clergymen ineligible for
state offices. Such a provision today would
be suspect as a violation of the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment9 7 - certainly
it would not be regarded as a prohibition of
establishment. Further, it is difficult to see
what the interrelation, if any, expressed in
the Harmon case has to do with the objective
of the Everson opinion - the incorporation
of the establishment clause into the Four-
teenth Amendment. Whatever interrelation
is expressed by the Harmon dicta, 98 it is at
most some connection between the rescue of
temporal institutions from religious inter-
ference and the protection of religious liberty
from governmental interference. Does Mr.
Justice Black equate "no law respecting the
establishment of religion" with the rescue of
"temporal institutions from religious inter-
ference"? It is ordinarily supposed that aid
'S.C. Const. art. 1, q23 (1790). The interrelation
between this provision and the guarantee of re-
ligious freedom [S.C. Const. art. VIII, §1 (1790)]
becomes even more tenuous when we remember
that it was retained from Article XXI of the South
Carolina Constitution of 1778; this Constitution
also provided in Article XXXVIII:
That all persons and religious societies who
acknowledge that there is one God, and a future
state of rewards and punishments, and that God
is publicly to be worshipped, shall be freely tol-
erated. The Christian Protestant religion shall be
deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to
be, the established religion of this State. That all
denominations of Christian Protestants, demean-
ing themselves peaceable and faithfully, shall en-
joy equal religious and civil privileges.
"'Madison so regarded such proposals: Madison.
Letter to Henry Lee in 2 Writings of James Madi-
son 288 (Hunt ed. 1901 ). In fact, it is precisely
where there is an established church, as in Eng-
land today and in the South Carolina of 1778, that
such provisions occur, and there is a real need for
a separation of church and state. Where both are
officially recognized as parts of one sovereignty,
a separation of powers is in order.
"See comments in notes 96 and 97 supra.
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by the state to religion may result in domina-
tion of religious bodies by the state, " not
vice versa. Nor does such freedom of tem-
poral institutions from ecclesiastical domi-
nation appear prominent in the meaning of
the establishment clause as defined by Mr.
Justice Black in the very next paragraph of
his opinion:
The "establishment of religion" clause of
the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither
can force nor influence a person to go to or
to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or dis-
belief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing re-
ligious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church at-
tendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever they may be called, or what-
ever form they may adopt to teach or prac-
tice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, parti-
cipate in the affairs of any religious organi-
zations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against estab-
lishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between Church
and State."'"
The Court has never since squarely faced
the problem why the "liberty" of the Four-
teenth Amendment should include the estab-
lishment clause of the First; and the cavalier
solution attempted in the Everson case is
far from satisfactory. The rest of the story
is soon told. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
'See the remark of Mr. Justice Jackson on this
danger in Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1, 27 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
" Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-
16 (1947).
Board of Education,' the Court assumed
that is was so included and expressly refused
to distinguish or overrule its "holding" to
that effect in the Everson case.' -' The clause
was there held to forbid the use of public
school buildings to conduct classes in reli-
gion for pupils whose parents so requested.
In Doremus v. Board of Education,"3 the
Court made the same assumption but denied
the standing of a taxpayer to enjoin the read-
ing of the Old Testament and the Lord's
Prayer in New Jersey public schools.' 0 4 In
the recent case of Zorach v. Clauson,"1 7 the
Court allowed the New York public schools
to release, during certain hours, those pupils
who wished to attend religious instruction
conducted off the school premises. The
Zorach case again affirmed the "holding"
of the McCollum opinion that the establish-
ment clause was made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is clear from these later cases that the
problem of the application of the establish-
ment clause to the states has not been faced
since the Everson decision. Indeed, the prob-
lem has been largely lost sight of. Since
1947, the Court has simply asked itself one
question: Does the challenged action violate
our concept of the "separation" which we
"'333 U.S. 203 (1948).
'"1d. at 211.
'"342 U.S. 429 (1952).
'°'A recent New Jersey case, Tudor v. Board of
Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953), held
that the First Amendment's establishment clause
was violated when the Board allowed distribution
of New Testaments after school on public school
premises by a Bible Society to those pupils whose
parents so requested. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey distinguished its earlier holding in Dore-
mus v. Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 71 A.2d
732 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 429
(1952).
1°0-343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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assume should exist between church and
state? If so, it will be held contrary either
to the establishment clause of the First
Amendment or to the free exercise clause,
as seems best suited to the facts of the case.
Thus, in Zorach v. Clauson,1°0 Mr. Justice
Douglas flatly stated: "The constitutional
standard is the separation of Church and
State." And in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathe-
dral,07 the test for the Court was whether
a New York statute "violates our rule of
separation between church and state." The
offending statute was therefore banned under
the "free exercise" clause.
Some Conclusions
(1) In the state ratifying conventions
and the first Congress, the relation of the
federal government to religion was regarded
as a problem in federalism. They feared, not
only federal interference with individual
religious freedom, but also federal inter-
ference with state establishments or quasi-
establishments then existing. To them, there
was a danger of such interference with state
sovereignty by affirmative federal action to
establish a national religion, or by negative
action disestablishing state establishments.
(2) This concept found complete expres-
sion in the formula finally adopted for the
First Amendment, as supplemented by the
general reservation of powers expressed in
the Tenth Amendment. The free exercise
clause precluded federal interference with
individual religious freedom. The establish-
ment clause prevented any federal interfer-
ence, whether affirmative or negative, with
existing state establishments: it reserved all
'Id. at 314.
1-344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952).
power in this regard to the several states.
(3) As a reservation of power, the estab-
lishment clause is not per se a constitutional
guarantee of liberty. A clause which in effect
told the states in 1789 that they had all
power over religion so far as the Constitu-
tion was concerned, cannot in 1940 be read
into the word "liberty" of the Fourteenth
Amendment to mean that they have no
power.
(4) If Madison and the other framers of
the First Amendment considered the estab-
lishment clause to be anything more than
a reservation of power to the states, it was
as a political duty imposed upon the federal
government. Even if meant as an additional
safeguard to religious freedom from federal
encroachment, it does not thereby become
a constitutional right of the citizen. Hence,
however wise this additional safeguard may
be, it is not in itself a liberty, and certainly
is not so fundamental as to be "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 0
(5) Certainly the Fourteenth Amendment
does, and should, protect the religious free-
dom of the citizen against state invasion.
I have no fundamental quarrel with those
who would achieve this effect by incorporat-
ing the constitutional guarantee of the First
Amendment. This guarantee is, however,
expressed in the free exercise clause. At the
same time, any state action - whether called
establishment or some sweeter name-which
infringes upon the religious freedom of the
individual, should be forbidden to the states
under the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. But state activity which
does not in any way infringe the religious
'~Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-26
(1937).
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freedom of the individual, 09 should not be
forbidden to the states simply because it
happens to fit the Supreme Court's idea of
a "law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion" - and still less on the even more doc-
trinaire ground that it violates their concept
of "separation of church and state."
(6) The inclusion of the establishment
clause into the liberty of the Fourteenth
Amendment by the Supreme Court has no
firm basis in the history of the clause or in
logic; and the sole attempt to justify its inclu-
sion has been unsatisfactory. Further, it is
unnecessary. The religious freedom of
American citizens has been more than ade-
quately safeguarded by state constitutions 1 0
and laws. I believe that freedom is safer
in the hands of the legislatures and judges
of forty-eight states"1 than at the mercy of
varying interpretations by nine men sitting
in Washington. 112 Let the Supreme Court,
"It is difficult to see how such infringement was
present in the Tudor case, cited in note 104 supra,
where every precaution was taken to see that no
embarrassment came to pupils who were not to
receive the Bibles. Nor was there any claim to
this effect made in the Everson, McCollum, and
Zorach cases - although in these it is easier to see
how such constraint might be involved.
"'The various state constitutions contain, alto-
gether, more than 900 provisions on the subject of
religion and religious freedom.
."Anyone conversant with the enormous mass of
state cases on the subject will agree with the state-
ment that religious freedom has been well pro-
tected on the state level.
" 
2 As but one example of the extremes between
which the Court has alternated, compare Miners-
ville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940), with West Virginia Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). While the move-
ment of the Court has been toward greater liber-
under the liberty of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, prescribe minimal standards of reli-
gious freedom: the states are still free to
enlarge these standards by their own consti-
tutions113 and laws. But the added restric-
tion of the establishment clause by the Court
is ptecisely that use of the Fourteenth
Amendment which Holmes so much depre-
cated. 114 It substitutes the judgment of the
Supreme Court for that of local representa-
tive bodies in determining the wisdom of
such social experiments as were attacked in
the McCollum and Zorach cases. It may
eventually result in an abridgement of the
very religious freedom which the Court de-
sires so earnestly to safeguard.""
ality, there is no guarantee that this will always
be true. Meanwhile, it is disquieting to note that.
prior to 1940, those aggrieved by state action re-
lied almost exclusively on the guarantees of re-
ligious freedom in the state constitutions; since
then, almost exclusive reliance has been placed on
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
"'These are in general much more detailed provi-
sions.
.'See his dissent in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312, 342, at 344 (1921).
"'Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203.
238 (1948), points to some concrete possibilities,
which could be multiplied ad infinitum. Consider.
for instance, the extremely valuable aid given to
organized religious groups by the exemption of
their ministry and theological students from mili-
tary service; and the very practical effect on the
free exercise of religion if the broad interpreta-
tion of establishment in the Everson case were to
overrule the holding in Arver v. United States, 245
U.S. 366, 389, 390 (1918), and United States v.
Stephens, 245 Fed. 956 (D. Del. 1917), afl'd per
curiam, 247 U. S. 504 (1918). The problem is
magnified when consideration is given to the
thousand and one areas where the state govern-
ments come into contact with religion.
